Two related paradoxes also emerge from the same basic conception of the aesthetic experience. The first was given extended consideration by Hegel, who argued roughly as follows: our sensuous attention and that gives to the work of art its peculiar individuality. Because it addresses itself to our sensory appreciation, the work of art is essentially concrete, to be understood by an act of perception rather than by a process of discursive thought.

At the same time, our understanding of the work of art is in part intellectual; we seek in it a conceptual content, which it presents to us in the form of an idea. One purpose of critical interpretation is to expound this idea in discursive form—to give the equivalent of the content of the work of art in another, nonsensuous idiom. But criticism can never succeed in this task, for, by separating the content from the particular form, it abolishes its individuality. The content presented then ceases to be the exact content of that work of art. In losing its individuality, the content loses its aesthetic reality; it thus ceases to be a reason for attending to the particular work and that first attracted our critical attention. It cannot be this that we saw in the original work and that explained its power over us.

For this content, displayed in the discursive idiom of the critical intellect, is no more than a husk, a discarded relic of a meaning that eluded us in the act of seizing it. If the content is to be the true object of aesthetic interest, it must remain wedded to its individuality: it cannot be detached from its “sensuous embodiment” without being detached from itself. Content is, therefore, inseparable from form and form in turn inseparable from content. (It is the form that it is only by virtue of the content that it embodies.)

Hegel’s argument is the archetype of many, all aimed at showing that it is both necessary to distinguish form from content and also impossible to do so. This paradox may be resolved by rejecting either of its premises, but, as with Kant’s antinomy, neither premise seems dispensable. To suppose that content and form are inseparable is, in effect, to dismiss both ideas as illusory, since no two works of art can then share either a content or a form-the form being definitive of each work’s individuality.

In this case, no one could ever justify his interest in a work of art by reference to its meaning. The intensity of aesthetic interest becomes a puzzling, and ultimately inexplicable, feature of our mental life. If, on the other hand, we insist that content and form are separable, we shall never be able to find, through a study of content, the reason for attending to the particular work of art that intrigues us. Every work of art stands proxy for its paraphrase. An impassable gap then opens between aesthetic experience and its ground, and the claim that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable is thrown in doubt.

1. Hegel argued that .

[A] it is our sensuous appreciation that gives peculiar individuality to the work of art

[B] it is the content of the work of art that holds our attention

[C] the work of art cannot be understood without a process of logical thinking

[D] the form of the work of art is what our sensuous appreciation concentrates on

2. It can be inferred from this passage that .

[A] the paradox that it is both necessary to distinguish form content and also impossible to do so cannot be resolved by rejecting its premises

[B] both content and form of the work of art are illusory

[C] the content and form of the work of art are separable

[D] aesthetic experience is not intrinsically valuable

3. Which of the following is NOT what Hegel believed?

[A] The content and form of the work of art cannot be separated from each other.

[B] The content of the work of art is always the true object of aesthetic interest.

[C] The content presented without any individuality is not the content of the work of art.

[D] The content understood by means of a process of discursive thought is no more than a husk.

4. Premises that are related to each other seems to be dispensable because .

[A] Kant thinks they are indispensable

[B] either of them can resolve the paradox

[C] the premises are separated

[D] the premises can account for the theory

5. This passage is mainly about .

[A] the sensuous appreciation of art

[B] the basic conception of the aesthetic experience

[C] how to appreciate the work of art

[D] the relationship between form and content of the work of art

参考答案

1.D本题的答案线索可以在第一段的最后一句话中找到。A项应该是sensuous attention. B项没有提到，C项正是黑格尔所反对的。

2.A根据第四段的内容，康德对开始两句话的否定，表明对两个前提中的一个予以否定是不可能的，这与A项的内容相符合。

3.B本项可以根据第二段中的内容得到答案，第二句话开始人们试图对艺术品找到一个实在东西表达其含义，但是失败了。所以B项的内容是错误的。

4.B因为二者对解决这个paradox没有作用，所以他们是可有可无的。

5.D通读全文即可知道，主要是黑格尔对艺术的内容和形式之间的关系进行的论述。所以很明显正确答案为D。

译文

两个相关的自相矛盾也产生于同一个基本概念——即美学经验。黑格尔对第一个矛盾做了详尽的论述，他大抵认为：我们的感觉注意及表现在艺术品方面的感觉注意是极其个性化的。因为艺术品将自己置入我们的感官鉴赏，所以它本质上是具体的，是被我们的感觉而不是游离的思想所理解。

同时，我们对艺术品的理解也需要部分智力，我们从中寻求概念化的内容，它以观念的形式呈现给我们。批判性解释的一个目的就是用游离的形式详细地解释这个观念——将艺术品的内容用非感觉的方式呈现出来。但是批评永远都不会成功，因为在将内容和某一形式分离的过程中已经破坏了其个性。此时呈现的内容已经不是那件艺术品的真实内容。丢失了个性，内容也就失去了其美学实体，从而它也就不会成为我们之所以注意那件作品和最初吸引我们批判注意的原因。也正是因为这样我们才会觉得与解释相比，原作带给我们的震撼力总是那么强大。

因为这种被游离思想批判过的内容充其量不过就是一个躯壳，一个逃避我们扑捉被抛弃了的意义。如果内容要成为美学欣赏的真正对象，它必须保持其个性：它不与自身分离就不会同其“感觉镜像”分离。因此内容不能脱离形式，形式也不能脱离内容。(形式只能依靠内容来体现。)

黑格尔的观点是很多观点的原形，所有观点都旨在说明将形式和内容分离的必要性和不可能性。抛弃他们各自的前提这一矛盾体也许可以解决，但正如康德的自相矛盾论，任何一个前提都是不可分割的。认为内容和形式不可分割，实际上就是认为这两个观念是虚幻的，因为没有两件艺术作品能够共享一个内容或形式——每一个作品个性的确定形式。

因此，任何人都不能通过参考艺术作品的意义来欣赏它。强烈的美学兴趣变成一种迷惑的，几乎无法说明的精神世界的特征。如果另一方面，我们坚持内容和形式是可分的，我们永远都不能通过研究内容来发现一件艺术作品吸引我们的真正原因。对每件艺术作品的解释得到的都只是它的替身。在美学经验和其本质之间就会出现不可逾越的鸿沟，而美学经验在本质上是有价值的论断也就值得怀疑。